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Separation and Dependence: Explaining Modern 
Corporate Governance 
Stephen J. Lubben 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
I used the occasion of my inaugural Wiley lecture to set forth my 
understanding of corporate governance; this Essay sets forth the 
substance of that lecture.  As might be expected from one who spent 
their practice career dealing with deviant corporate governance in 
Chapter 11, the views expressed here are somewhat different than 
most of the extant theory in the area. 
For clarity, this Essay will refer to corporate governance as a 
“horizontal model” of governance, because the central argument of 
this Essay is that key aspects of corporate governance—which the 
model identifies as officers, directors, and shareholders—have a 
shared role in exercising corporate power.  Each has a piece of the 
overall quantity of corporate power, but none can take significant 
corporate action independently.1  That is, each of the players in 
corporate governance has an incomplete piece of corporate power.  
In this way, power is separated and also codependent. 
In my lecture and in this Essay I explain this horizontal model of 
corporate governance by examining each of the three elements of 
governance, and explaining the implications of my conception of 
governance.  But first, thorough analysis requires examination of 
some foundational questions.  Namely, what is the purpose of 
corporate governance and whom does it involve? 
*     *     * 
Both scholars and practitioners quite often neglect the goals and 
aims of corporate governance.2  Perhaps the purpose of governance is 
 
 Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business Ethics, 
Seton Hall University School of Law.  I appreciate the time that Tim Glynn and 
Oscar Couwenberg took to read and comment on an early draft of these remarks. 
 1  See Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward A Theory of 
Takeover Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103, 120 (2003). 
 2  E.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs 
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seen as self-evident—the kind of question only an academic would 
ask—but only by understanding the purpose can one identify the key 
players. 
For example, if one views the purpose of governance as enabling 
corporations to do “good” in society, however that might be defined, 
then it might be argued that the media is part of governance, 
inasmuch as they shame managers into taking certain actions.  If so, 
then concern may exist about the tendency of the business press to 
get quite cozy with the business community, a form of capture that 
could undermine this conception of corporate governance.  Of 
course, taking on the regulation of the business press expands 
corporate law and corporate governance in new, uncharted 
directions. 
In the horizontal model the purpose of corporate governance is 
defined as providing structure to the exercise of power within a 
corporation, to ensure that power is used to achieve the firm’s goals.  
This, of course, requires specification of the goal of corporations.  
This Essay focuses on for-profit, public corporations, and therefore 
assumes that the fundamental goal of the corporation is to increase 
its own value.  Doing so benefits all of the participants, however 
defined.  For example, while this analysis excludes employees or 
trade creditors from my conception of corporate governance, they 
are the indirect beneficiaries of corporate growth through more 
stable employment and product orders. 
As a companion goal, this Essay posits that all firms must aim to 
survive.  More precisely, they must increase their value in ways that 
minimize the risk that the firm will destroy its own value.  This does 
not mean the firm should fear risk, but it does suggest that corporate 
governance should not aim to benefit diversified, risk-neutral 
shareholders above all else.  That is, the firm must maximize its risk-
adjusted growth, not its potential growth in the abstract. 
Specifically, while this Essay conceives of corporate governance 
as a means of maximizing firm value, it expressly rejects the notion 
that governance must maximize share price.  Indeed, the argument is 
made that managing to share price is one of the fundamental flaws of 
both recent corporate governance and many of the proposed 
reforms.3  In this analysis, maximizing firm value, which will typically 
also be consistent with maximizing shareholder value, is distinct from 
maximizing share price, inasmuch as share price is but an imperfect 
 
/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.  
 3  William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 667 (2010). 
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representation of value.4  This point is analyzed in greater detail 
below. 
*     *     * 
Only by defining the purpose of corporate governance can one 
understand its features, since it is necessary to know what features are 
relevant to the discussion.  The remainder of this Essay will focus on 
the three aspects of corporate governance and the ways in which 
these parts are both separate from and dependent on each other.  It 
is this joint reality—separation and dependence—that gives modern 
American corporate governance its essential character. 
In short, the analysis set forth by this Essay rejects the 
conception of corporate governance as a set of linear axes, as 
famously advanced by Stephen Bainbridge.5  Instead, power within a 
corporation is balanced in three ways, with the officers holding the 
bulk of power, but monitored by a largely independent board, which 
itself is constrained at the outer margins by shareholders. 
Power is concentrated in the managers, who have not only day-
to-day authority over the firm, but also a large ability to frame issues 
considered by the other branches of power, especially the board.  But 
the board holds the ultimate power to change the identity of the 
managers, the ability to initiate most fundamental transactions under 
corporate law, and the authority to bind the corporation as a matter 
of agency law.6  As such, the board checks any managerial inclination 
to ignore the interests of other stakeholders in the firm.7 
But what if the board fails in its duties?  Shareholders hold the 
means of preventing this through both voting rights and fiduciary 
duties, which prevent the board from acting with extreme malice or 
in the board members’ self-interest.  Shareholder power is 
intentionally limited to these extreme issues. 
This is a conception of corporate governance that is in harmony 
with much of the existing academic literature.  For example, in 
expressly rejecting the notion of shareholders as owners entitled as a 
 
 4  Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 
1989). 
 5  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2003). 
 6  See, e.g., Thomas Earl Geu, A Selective Overview of Agency, Good Faith and Delaware 
Entity Law, 10 DEL. L. REV. 17, 31–32 (2008); Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The 
Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 755 (2007); Joan MacLeod 
Heminway, Enron’s Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; Unanswered Questions, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1167, 1170–71 (2003). 
 7  See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 295–96 (1999).  
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matter of course to control the firm, the horizontal model adopts a 
contractual view of the corporation, which conceives of shareholders 
as one of many claimants in a firm. 
On the other hand, the horizontal model rejects not only the 
shareholder supremacy model of the corporation,8 but the director 
primacy and officer primacy versions as well.  This Essay 
acknowledges the importance of each and concedes a central role to 
officers; however, unlike most, the horizontal model ultimately 
describes each as equivalent parts of corporate governance. 
At the same time, the horizontal model also rejects the notion 
that other stakeholders—like employees or creditors—play an 
essential role in corporate governance.9  These stakeholders are 
beneficiaries of the system, but have no direct governance role. 
In short, the horizontal model conceives of governance as a self-
reinforcing scheme to allow managers to do their jobs while guarding 
against managerial wrongdoing.  Despite the common reference to 
“checks and balances,” however, corporate governance is not such a 
system.10  For example, the officers have no “check” over shareholders 
and indeed such power would make no sense.  Thus, instead of 
operating as a circular structure of countervailing power, governance 
power in a corporation is largely concentrated with the officers.  Yet, 
like a jigsaw puzzle, the board and—to a lesser degree—the 
shareholders, hold essential pieces of that power. 
With that overview, this analysis first sets forth the understanding 
under the horizontal model of the role of officers in corporate 
governance. 
II.  MANAGEMENT 
This analysis begins with the idea that managers—or officers—
have the largest amount of power in a public corporation, although 
this does not necessarily mean they have the most important 
components of power.11  While the corporate laws of most states 
literally provide that the business of the corporation is to be managed 
by or under the direction of the board of directors, it is clear that the 
 
 8  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001). 
 9  Contra Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing 
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1226–28 (2006).  
 10  Corporate Governance, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term 
=corporate-governance (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
 11  Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on Officer Liability, 67 BUS. LAW. 
75, 77–78 (2011). 
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board’s function is not actually to manage, but rather to oversee the 
management of the company. 
Under Delaware corporation law section 142(a), managers 
exercise delegated power from the board.12  This Essay, however, 
argues that this delegation does not mean that officers are 
subordinate to the board as is often stated or implied.  Such a 
conception of managers is rooted in the days when boards were 
largely comprised of inside directors.  In such a case, it was easy to see 
the board as the elite of the managers.  But today virtually all boards 
are independent of management, at least in a formal sense. 
Instead, under the horizontal model, management is considered 
the first of three parallel elements of corporate governance.  On the 
trading floor or at the plant, managers make the day-to-day decisions 
that have extreme importance for the overall well-being of the 
corporation and its constituents.13  Management also has a good deal 
of power to set the agenda for the corporation, given its control over 
the flow of information to the other elements of corporate 
governance.14 
Thus, while it is common to dismiss managers as mere agents 
exercising delegated power, the horizontal model suggests that there 
is something more at work here.  Namely, managers are more 
accurately Article II agents, rather than Article I agents.  That is, 
unlike the Congress exercising specifically defined bits of power 
given to the legislature by the Constitution, the managers of a public 
company exercise a power more like that held by the President. 
The nature of the grant is essentially open ended, subject to 
restraint only at the outer margins.  And this makes a lot of sense, 
since management is the only element of corporate governance that 
has day-to-day involvement with the actual operation of the company.  
In this way, management is also like the President, who, unlike 
Congress or the Supreme Court, never goes on recess, never leaves to 
teach summer classes in Europe, and never ceases to exercise the 
executive authority granted by the people of the United States. 
Boards meet maybe six, eight, or twelve times per year under 
normal conditions, and shareholders meet but once a year and even 
then mostly by proxy and not as a group.15  The 2011 Public Company 
 
 12  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (West 2013). 
 13  See Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort 
Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 396 (2004). 
 14  See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate 
Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1605–08 (2005).  
 15  Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950–2000: Major Changes 
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Governance Survey of the National Association of Corporate 
Directors suggests that public company directors spent an average of 
over 225 hours performing board-related activities in 2011.16  That is 
quite a bit, but it pales in comparison to the work of officers, and 
other senior managers, who likely exceed that in a single month.  
Only officers are present throughout and thus, it is they who have the 
broadest and least defined piece of corporate power. 
In short, officers and other managers are agents, but the 
horizontal model rejects the implication that as a result they are 
unimportant and can be ignored.  Thus, while there is merit in the 
assertions of Bainbridge, Blair, and Stout, among others, that the role 
of shareholders is too often overstated, the tendency to focus solely 
on the board-shareholder dynamic and promote hierarchical models 
of corporate governance is incorrect.17 
The inclination to ignore officers or managers is 
understandable, in that managers are not governed by “law” as 
commonly understood by corporate law professors.  Delaware 
corporate statutes focus almost exclusively on the board and the case 
law too has a heavy focus on directors.18  Indeed, until recently the 
Delaware Chancery Court did not have personal jurisdiction over 
officers.19 
Instead, the law that governs officers in most situations is agency 
law, which remains uncodified in most states.  Thus, while corporate 
finance scholarship tends to find agents under every rock and bush, 
managers actually are agents.20  But to the extent this is ever noted, it 
is typically only with regard to officers’ ability to bind the corporation 
to a contract with some outside third party.  The internal aspects of 
the relationship fly under the radar, probably because the board 
typically monitors this relationship away from the public eye. 
That, of course, does not mean that officers do not wield 
tremendous power.  It only explains why it so often goes unnoticed.  
Managers exercise the most basic aspects of corporate power and 
therefore play the largest role in corporate governance.21 
 
but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 363 (2000). 
 16  NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., NACD PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 
(2012–2013 ed., 2012). 
 17  Hierarchies, of course, exist in corporations as well as within the elements of 
corporate governance that this Essay describes. 
 18  For the rare exception, see Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 19   Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 462 n.28 (2004). 
 20  See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 301, 304 (1983). 
 21  See Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 827 
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III.  BOARDS 
If officer-managers exercise the greatest role in governance, 
corporate boards exercise the most important role.22  The board 
exercises two broad forms of power.  First, it has oversight 
responsibility with respect to managers and the corporation. Second, 
it has the power to initiate all significant corporate transactions and 
changes under Delaware corporate law. 
Oversight responsibility means the board has the ability to fire 
managers who misbehave.  But it also includes something more.  It is 
now clear under Delaware and federal law that the board has an 
obligation to consider how the company operates and whether it is in 
compliance with relevant law.23  That involves the board in a kind of 
monitoring and information-gathering that requires the board to 
work with management to understand the full picture.  But the board 
also has to go beyond management to understand the perceptions of 
all employees regarding the culture of the corporation, including the 
level of fear of retaliation for reporting suspected misconduct and 
whether employees believe that management is committed to abiding 
by the law. 
This is a change from the past, when the board was largely an 
advisor to senior management.24  But since Sarbanes-Oxley, that role 
has changed and should be acknowledged.  Further, Dodd-Frank 
suggests that there will be no return to the “good old days.” 
The board’s oversight responsibility also requires that the board 
keep the corporation in sight of its goals of self-preservation, thus 
increasing its value.  In light of recent events, it is easy to dismiss this 
as a problem only for financial institutions, but the automakers, 
particularly General Motors (GM), were slow to address problems 
that had been obvious since at least the 1980s.25  And British 
Petroleum’s (BP) recent troubles in the Gulf of Texas show that 
failures in risk management have serious consequences, the full 
extent of which are still unknown, as the government tries to prove 
gross negligence on BP’s part.26 
 
(2011). 
 22  See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why 
Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 668 
(2003).   
 23  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 24  Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
923, 930–31 (2010). 
 25  Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 197 (Del. 1991).  
 26  See generally BP Trial, FIN. TIMES, http://www.ft.com/indepth/bp-trial (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2013). 
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This is not to say that the board is the corporation’s risk and 
compliance manager.  That power belongs with management.  The 
directors should determine the company’s reasonable risk appetite—
for example, financial, safety, reputation, and a myriad of other 
risks—and satisfy themselves that the risk management processes 
designed and implemented by managers are consistent with the 
company’s goals.  The board must also make sure that these systems 
are functioning as described and that necessary steps have been taken 
to foster a culture of risk-adjusted decision-making throughout the 
firm. 
The board provides the check on the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) in this context, the only other party with governance power 
that is likely to have a clear view of any substantial part of the 
operation of a large company. 
Under Delaware corporate law, the board is also the holder of 
the power to initiate any significant corporate transaction.  The idea 
will often come from management, but be it an asset sale or a 
merger, only the board can start the corporation down that path.27  
This means that the board has a veto over the exercise of power by 
either of the other two elements of corporate governance.  Similarly, 
it is only the board, and not the shareholders or management, that 
has the power to bind the corporate entity as a matter of agency law, 
further providing a check on the exercise of power by the other 
aspects of the firm. 
In short, under the horizontal conception of corporate 
governance, the board is not primary.  Rather, it holds a high degree 
of power, but that power is limited to specific, high importance 
topics.  The difference between this and director primacy is subtle 
and mostly turns on the role allocated to managers, as discussed, and 
shareholders, discussed below. 
IV.  SHAREHOLDERS 
Shareholders have three rights: 
1) The right to vote, unless they hold nonvoting shares28 
2) The right to a dividend, unless the board does not declare 
one29 
3) The right to a proportionate share of capital upon 
 
 27  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (West 2013). 
 28  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151, 212 (West 2013). 
 29  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (West 2013). 
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dissolution, unless the company is insolvent.30 
These are not the indications of ownership, as commonly 
understood.  They are signs of weakness.  And this Essay submits that 
this weakness is by design. 
At heart, a share is a measure of one’s interest in a corporation 
and nothing more.  Any remaining rights are extremely fragile.  For 
example, if you are a holder of Google class A shares—the primary 
publicly traded kind—you receive one-tenth the voting rights of the 
majority shareholders31 and no dividends.32  Fortunately, the company 
is not insolvent, so you still retain your right to a distribution on 
dissolution.  Despite this dissipated basket of rights, investors seem 
quite eager to buy Google shares.  After all, as of this writing it has a 
market capitalization of about $270 billion.33 
Most publicly traded corporations do not go this far.  Instead, 
shareholders retain voting rights under the typical “one share one 
vote” regime and they have a right to any dividends paid.  For large 
companies, these dividends tend to result in small, steady payouts 
each quarter. 
The voting rights give shareholders a yes/no vote on board 
membership.  With regard to incumbent members, shareholders are 
essentially passing on the members’ past actions.  Only in extreme 
cases will the shareholder know if a board member’s performance 
was lacking.  With regard to new members, shareholders’ votes are 
essentially a commentary on the actions of the existing board in 
selecting the candidate. 
Chancellor Allen, now Professor Allen, famously proclaimed that 
“[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”34  This premise 
remains true, but only if it is understood that directorial legitimacy is 
probably more dependent on informal boundaries.  The shareholder 
franchise proscribes but a broad frame on managerial and board 
power. 
The wisdom of shareholder primacy is doubtful, instead 
 
 30  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 275, 281(a) (West 2013). 
 31  GOOGLE, FOURTH AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF 
GOOGLE INC. (2012), available at http://investor.google.com/pdf/google-fourth-
amended-and-restated-certificate-of-incorporation.pdf.   
 32  Google Inc., GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/finance?client=ob&q=NASDAQ 
:GOOG (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
 33  Google Market Cap, YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/GOOG/market 
_cap (last visited Mar. 14, 2013). 
 34  Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).  
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governance should advance corporate interests, which often, but not 
always, correspond with shareholder interests in some general sense.  
Those who would advance shareholder primacy have some obligation 
to explain which shareholder should be prime: the retiree investor, 
the thirty-something investor, the index mutual fund, or the hedge 
fund that owns the shares as part of a larger basis trade.  It is also 
likely that their interests are only aligned when considered at a very 
general level. 
Given the disparate interests of the shareholders, it makes sense 
that their power is limited to policing the edges of directorial power.  
While their interests are diverse, it seems likely that none would 
countenance dishonest board members. 
Too often the weakness of the shareholder franchise is 
denounced by some false analogy to political voting rights.  When an 
investor buys a share, he or she buys an interest in a corporation that 
comes with weak voting rights.  There is no similarity between that 
investment interest and the denial of a person’s political rights on the 
basis of race, protected by the Fifteenth Amendment,35 or sex, 
protected by the Nineteenth Amendment,36 or age, protected by the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment.37  Among other things, share ownership is 
a choice, entered into with knowledge of the rights that come in 
exchange for the investment. 
Shareholders are interest holders in the firm—holding a distinct 
kind of interest that comes with specified powers.  They are not 
owners and they have no democratic entitlement to vote. 
*     *     * 
One may note that this analysis has yet to even mention fiduciary 
duties.  This is intentional, as it is not the shareholders who are the 
beneficiary of these duties, but rather the corporation.38  In the 
original English corporate cases, dating back to the middle of the 
Nineteenth Century, shareholders had no power to enforce such 
corporate obligations.39  Rather, it was a power that rested in the 
board alone. 
 
 35  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 36  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 37  U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 38  Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 237–38 (5th Cir. 1983) (“When an officer, 
director, or controlling shareholder breaches a fiduciary duty to the corporation, the 
shareholder has ‘no standing to bring [a] civil action at law against faithless directors 
and managers,’ because the corporation and not the shareholder suffers the injury.  
Equity . . . , however, allow[s] him to step into the corporation’s shoes and to seek in 
its right the restitution he could not demand on his own.” (citation omitted)). 
 39  Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189; 2 Hare 461. 
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In modern times, shareholders enforce the duties in but limited 
circumstances, and do so on behalf of the corporation as a whole.40  
Essentially, the shareholders are limited to acting as a backstop to the 
board, protecting corporate interests only when the board fails to do 
so.  In this respect, the derivative suit acts as a supplemental check on 
board corruption or incompetence.  But it is necessary to keep in 
mind the limits.  Not only are shareholder actions limited by the 
demand requirements,41 but the subject of such actions is limited to 
breaches of the duty of loyalty. 
Duty of care violations are typically protected by the twin pillars 
of the business judgment rule and, in most states, strong exculpation 
provisions.42  The only duty of care claims that survive are those so 
egregious that they amount to de facto duty of loyalty violations. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
Under the horizontal conception of corporate governance, 
managers have the bulk of corporate power, but not the most 
important bits.  Those belong to the board, which has important 
powers over a limited set of key issues.  Shareholders provide 
boundaries to the exercise of power by both the board and 
management.  Shareholders are a disorganized bunch that typically 
only unite to exercise this power in extreme situations, but otherwise, 
the ability of shareholders to control board action is quite limited.43  
This is by design, allowing management and the board to exercise the 
discretion with which they have been vested and to run the business 
of the corporation. 
This horizontal conception of corporate governance also 
explains the rather limp duty of care, particularly in Delaware.  A 
more robust duty of care, enforceable by shareholders, would allow 
the shareholders to intrude on the power of managers and the board.  
But if one accepts this understanding of corporate governance, as this 
analysis does, then it leads to several other important implications. 
First off, because this conception of governance is based on a 
 
 40  See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) 
(“[A] court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter’s 
decision can be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.”‘). 
 41   Derivative Actions by Shareholders, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 327 (West 2013); 
see also Shareholder Derivative Actions, CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 et seq. (West 2013).  
 42  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2013) (contents of certificate of 
incorporation); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 12371 (West 2013) (standards of 
performance). 
 43  See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 
679–94 (2007). 
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balance of powers, things that undermine that balance should be 
approached with skepticism.  Not to say that change is impossible, or 
that the status quo is perfect, but rather, such changes should be 
examined carefully before proceeding.  Some recent changes have 
been enacted without careful study.44  For example, recent decades 
have seen a move away from salary toward share-based compensation.  
Salary has dropped to less than twenty percent of total executive pay 
in the United States (from forty-two percent as recently as 1993).45 
But share based compensation can blur lines between centers of 
power and provide incentives that would not normally exist.  Under 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), profits can be 
manipulated in a way that will not become clear for years and 
bonuses are quite often paid out for shorter-term improvements in 
earnings or share price.  Therefore, share-based compensation 
merely drives short-termism and manipulation. 
Shareholder empowerment moves, which have been quite 
common in recent years, similarly risk disrupting the system and 
allowing shareholders to intrude into the separate space the law has 
traditionally given to officers and directors.  The trade-off between 
short- and long-term growth is particularly plain when hedge funds 
and other shareholders press boards for stock buybacks, special 
dividends, spin-offs, and other transactions.  The board and 
management must have some degree of space to achieve overall 
corporate objectives, which are often not the same thing as 
maximizing the share price here and now. 
Too much of corporate governance has been driven, even co-
opted, by the faith in modern finance—that is, post-war finance.  In 
the world of corporate finance, share prices represent company value 
perfectly. 
But this is also a world in which all investors have the same 
understanding and beliefs about share value, investors can buy stocks 
on margin at the same rate the government pays on money investors 
deposit in Treasury securities, and returns are symmetric and 
investors are equally adverse to up and down movements in share 
price.46  To varying degrees, none of this is true, so should there be so 
much faith in the notion that capital markets are efficient all of the 
time either? 
 
 44  Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1585 (2005). 
 45  M. Alix Valenti & Michael Wolfe, From 1993 to 2003: Changes to Executive Pay, 23 
J. OF COMPENSATION & BENEFITS 6 (2007). 
 46  STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, CORPORATE FINANCE (forthcoming 2014). 
LUBBEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2013  11:52 AM 
2013] SEPARATION AND DEPENDENCE 905 
There is no real assurance that observed prices are a meaningful 
indication of long-term company value, rather than the current 
supply and demand for the shares.  Of course, supply and demand 
are somewhat affected by expectations of long-term value, but they 
are also affected by additional considerations, such as whether the 
company is included in an index in which many funds invest, and 
whether the company is a good proxy for another firm in the industry 
that is part of a large arbitrage strategy. 
For example, I was told that during the GM bankruptcy one 
common trade was to buy GM debt and short Ford stock.  That gave 
the shareholder the return GM was paying in its Chapter 11 plan, but 
took out the general auto industry risk associated with the trade.  It 
also likely had an affect on Ford share prices that revealed nothing 
about the value of Ford as a corporation. 
It is often argued that maximizing shareholder wealth by 
maximizing share price is a sensible objective only if we have some 
belief that prices are meaningful47—there are real reasons to doubt 
this.  Thus, the idea of increasing shareholder power to make 
directors and management more sensitive to maximizing share price, 
gives reason for pause. 
Again, this does not mean all is right with the status quo.  For 
example, boards have done a particularly poor job of tackling the 
problem of underperforming directors.  Indeed, sometimes they 
seem to encourage underperformance. 
Too often boards seem to be risk adverse in their selections, 
picking the same directors that every other big corporation has on its 
board.  But if one sits on four or five big corporate boards, and has a 
full-time job, there is reason to believe that they will not have 
adequate time or attention to devote to all.  This is particularly true 
because the board members that also have full-time jobs are generally 
not working on a nine-month academic calendar and are in roles that 
go beyond a nine-to-five workday. 
The responsibilities and time commitments required for board 
service today, as well as the complexity of risk management, 
reporting, and other issues that directors must oversee, has raised the 
bar for effective board service.  The time has come for boards to 
think outside the box with regard to membership. 
As a result, they might also address, however unintentionally, the 
other legitimate concerns many have with regard to the diversity of 
 
 47  See Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: “Derivative Reality” and the Law and 
Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEX. L. REV. 985, 1008 (1995).  
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current S&P 500 boards.  If for nothing else, doing so might reduce 
the equally troubling tendency toward groupthink that too many 
financial institution boards have exhibited in the past decade.  
Expertise is important, but not if it comes at the price of directors not 
asking the hard questions. 
This is an area where boards have only themselves to blame for 
misguided provisions like Dodd-Frank’s proxy access rule, which 
would require companies to give investors a right to place their 
nominees to the board of directors on the company’s proxy 
materials,48 making it easier for shareholders to trigger contested 
elections.  The provision undermines the balance of power in the 
horizontal model of corporate governance—but it is a natural 
response to the board as insider club phenomena. 
The rule is on hold due to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit’s ruling in Business Roundtable v. SEC.49  But the composition of 
the D.C. Circuit is not static, and the SEC will undoubtedly try again.  
Therefore, boards will have a limited amount of time to fix the 
problem themselves. 
*     *     * 
The horizontal conception of corporate governance provides a 
good description of the current reality of American corporate 
governance.  Shareholders do not have anything like ownership 
power, so the practice of calling them “owners” should be 
discontinued.  The board is powerful, but it is not a full-time 
institution.  Its power is limited to those high-level functions that 
must be trusted to someone other than management.  And 
management, too often neglected, is really a key source of much day-
to-day power, and consequently the holder of most, but not all, 
corporate power. 
Beyond the descriptive, should there also be normative changes?  
That is, should corporate governance be different than it is?  While 
there is unquestionably opportunities for improvement, future 
attempts to address the issue must be more thoughtful.  After all, the 
current model seems to have worked fairly well since its introduction 
almost a century ago here in New Jersey.50  Others, like those used in 
England and the Netherlands, have worked quite well too—there is 
no need to be parochial about reform. 
To be sure, the horizontal model does not always work to its 
 
 48  See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (West 2012). 
 49  647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011).   
 50  Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 609 (2003). 
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own, internal potential.  Companies, particularly in the 
pharmaceutical industry, continue to acknowledge compliance 
violations again and again.51 
The recent problems at Chase, both in trading and in money 
transfers, Citibank’s recent settlement of post-Lehman mortgage 
underwriting problems, and even the New York Stock Exchange’s 
favorable treatment of insiders, suggest that that industry still has a 
long way to go in developing a new culture.52  Nonetheless, the 
financial industry seems to be expending a lot of effort fighting 
regulation, when it would have more credibility in this regard if it got 
its own house in order.  Rather than tinkering with the model itself, 
this may be the most rational place to begin. 
 
 51  GlaxoSmithKline Corporate Integrity Agreement, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 
(June 28, 2012), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/GlaxoSmith 
Kline_LLC_06282012.pdf.  
 52  James Quinn, Stephen Hester: Banking Culture Change ‘Will Take a Generation’, 
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 29, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance 
/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9576646/Stephen-Hester-Banking-culture-change 
-will-take-a-generation.html. 
